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Abstract:. Over the last two decades Kazakhstan has 
implemented foreign policies aimed at improving relations 
with many new geopolitical actors, as well as longstanding 
common partners such as Russia, on which it was formerly 
heavily dependent. By utilising its huge hydrocarbon 
production potential, Kazakhstan has managed to surpass 
all other Central Asian states in political and economic 
importance. Kazakhstan has now turned its eyes to China, 
seeing it as an important and powerful partner in the 
economic, political and security spheres. This article deals 
with fundamental issues in Kazakhstan's relations with 
China. 
Kazakhstan has become an important player in 
Central Asia's regional relations in recent years. 
International observers have underscored the many 
positive changes made by the country. Kazakhstan has 
achieved higher levels of real economic and social 
development than other regional states. In macroeconomic 
terms, Kazakhstan has the largest economy in Central Asia 
and has recorded impressive growth levels since it gained 
independence in 1991. It quickly recovered from the 
depths of the 2008/2009 world economic crisis.' 
Kazakhstan's success is worth underscoring, as it is the 
only Central Asian country that appears in the list of 
countries with a high level of human development.^ 
However, it seems that a well-coordinated effort is being 
made by Astana and European Union members to 
overestimate the country's achievements, while 
conscientiously ignoring its problems.^ Western pundits 
also sometimes seem unwilling to criticise the 
'Kazakhstani path'" of development, although the country 
still has serious infrastructure problems,^ an authoritarian 
political system and an insufficient diverse economic 
base.*" It should be apparent to all stakeholders that, 
regardless of how impressive Kazakhstan's economic 
performance might appear at first glance, there is room for 
further improvement. The country is still largely 
dependent on its neighbours in various economic sectors 
and is continuously seeking opportunities to sustain its 
growth through regional and global economic cooperation. 
In that sense, China-Kazakhstan relations are especially 
important, not only in terms of overall trade turnover 
between the two countries, but because of the 
sustainability of both the 'Kazakhstan! path' and Central 
Asia's stability. 
Kazakhstan-China relations 
Political relations between Kazakhstan and China 
have been cordial since 1991, the year Kazakhstan 
achieved independence. Old disputes over their common 
border have been settled and closer political contacts 
established. Chinese and Kazakhstani officials often meet 
to discuss bilateral issues and, according to Astana,' . . . 
developing and maintaining good neighborly relations 
with China is a top priority'.' Both countries are members 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and 
other regional and sub-regional groupings committed to 
promoting political cooperation, economic development 
and security. This strong reciprocal support is deemed 
essential to achieve some of their most important mutual 
foreign policy goals. For instance, Kazakhstan supports 
Beijing's 'One China' policy, thus supporting Beijing's 
official position on Taiwan and Tibet,* while China backs 
Kazakhstan's almost two-decade-long bid to become a 
member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).' 
Equally positive are their bilateral economic 
relations, which have been intensifying for many years. 
China's willingness and ability to invest in Kazakhstan has 
been the main factor driving continual improvement in 
their trade relations.'" Impressive figures support these 
economic relations. In early 2011, for example, Beijing 
made a loan worth $ 1.7 billion to the Kazakhstani National 
Welfare Fund (Samruk-Kazyna) and another worth $5 
billion to the Kazakhstani petrochemical industry, in 
addition to pledging to buy Kazakhstani uranium for an 
estimated $8 billion." 
Astana welcomes this uptick in the Chinese 
influence, as it contributes to diversifying the country's 
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economy. Mutual trade relations were for many years 
concentrated in gas and oil exports from Kazakhstan to 
China. However, they have now entered into a process of 
diversification, and positive outcomes are expected from 
further economic integration between the two countries, 
especially in the border regions.'^ 
Improved bilateral relations underscore these 
beneficial developments and might in the midterm help 
Kazakhstan consolidate its achievements. Since 2011 
Kazakhstani and Chinese state officials have come 
together several times to discuss economic, political, 
cultural and security issues. In June 2011, Chinese 
President Hu Jintao and Kazakhstani President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev discussed the specifics of their security 
partnership, signed in 2005, and affixed their signatures on 
a document on 'Development of an All-Round Strategic 
Partnership', which stipulates a commitment to enhance 
bilateral trade and increase the frequency of meetings 
between top officials.'' Since the beginning of the 2000s 
Kazakhstan-China relations have been put on a strong 
footing. Nazarbayev and Hu Jintao, when they meet, leave 
the impression of sharing- a deep understanding. 
Kazakhstan's presidency of the SCO in the second half of 
2011 provided many opportunities for the two heads of 
state to discuss face-to-face various aspects of bilateral 
cooperation. Chinese officials have repeatedly expressed 
satisfaction with the evolution of bilateral trade relations in 
recent times and strongly supported the opening of the 
Khorgos International Centre of Boundary Cooperation, a 
transnational free trade centre on the border of Kazakhstan 
and China, spanning a 3.36 million m^ area of Chinese 
territory and 1.6 million m' area of Kazakhstani land.'" 
Kazakhstani and Chinese officials have ample reason 
to be content with the trade volumes between the two 
countries. In 2011, the bilateral trade volume amounted to 
$20 billion, up from a disappointing $8.3 billion in 2006. 
This is a significantly larger volume than the trade turnover 
between Kazakhstan and Russia, two countries that are 
trying to boost their trade through a customs union.'' 
Initially, Astana and Beijing set the goal of reaching a trade 
volume of $15 billion by 2015. Fortunately, the value of 
bilateral trade is already, in the first quarter of 2012, $5 
billion above the planned level. In addition to trade, 
Kazakhstan's friendship is also essential for China since it 
is a major transit country. For instance, the improvement of 
the railway connection between north-west China and 
south-east Kazakhstan and onward into Russia and 
Western Europe was at the top of the agenda in their 
bilateral discussion. 
These developments indicate that Kazakhstan is an 
increasingly important player in China's strategy in the 
Central Asia region, while Russia's influence in that-region 
is steadily declining in relative terms. China, Turkey and, 
to a much lesser extent, Iran are making rapid gains at the 
expense of Russia. This trend is evidenced both by data, as 
noted above, and by changes observable in both domestic 
markets and traditional bazaars across the region. The 
increasing Chinese presence is even changing the lifestyles 
of ordinary people. The flood of cheap and affordable 
Chinese goods has allowed Central Asians, even in the 
smallest and most remote villages, to buy products that 
they previously had never dreamed of seeing. In all 
probability, Russia wil l become progressively less able to 
hinder China's penetration into the region. Commercially, 
the fiiture does not look enviable for Moscow as by 2015 
the bilateral trade between China and Kazakhstan is 
expected to reach $40 billion,'^ an increase that wil l further 
strengthen China's foothold in Central Asia. 
Much to Moscow's dismay, improvements in 
Kazakhstani-Chinese economic relations are expected to 
increase even further in the years to come. At the end of 
September 2011, Chinese and Kazakhstani business 
people met to discuss investment projects between the two 
countries. The chairman of the Standing Committee of 
China's National People's Congress, Wu Bangguo, who 
attended the meeting, focused the talks on future 
cooperation possibilities in energy, mineral extraction, 
me ta l lu rgy , road and r a i l w a y cons t ruc t ion , 
telecommunications and agriculture. He also drew 
attention to the need to improve cooperation between 
Kazakhstani and Chinese firms and augment the volume of 
investments.'* Perhaps more importantly, Bangguo 
insisted that there are many opportunities for cooperation 
in manufacturing and service sectors. 
Since independence, Kazakhstan's president has been 
adamant about the necessity to diversify the Kazakhstani 
economy away from energy production and export, as this 
makes the country too dependent on flucmating oil and gas 
prices. A rapidly developing partner like China would 
certainly help President Nazarbayev achieve this 
objective. However, one can only be doubtfiil whether 
Chinese investments and cooperation will actually bring 
about economic diversification in Kazakhstan. The 
Kazakhstani elite, on which this process of diversification 
depends heavily, may not actually have a strong enough 
interest in altering the present economic structure. 
Kazakhstan's historical experience has demonstrated that 
poorly diversified economies, which rely heavily on 
natural resources for generating revenues, are the best 
models political and economic elites can use to indulge in 
kleptocracy." It remains to be seen whether the 
Kazakhstan-China economic partnership wi l l serve the 
interests of ordinary Kazakhstanis or merely the members 
of the president's circle. 
Energy cooperation 
Energy development and export largely dominates 
Kazakhstani-Chinese relations. Beijing considers Central 
Asia, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, a crucial 
element in its energy equation and has geared its policy in 
such a way as to secure as many resources as possible from 
this region.'" Central Asia can play a major role in helping 
Beijing diversify its energy suppliers. It can also reduce, by 
the same token, China's reliance on Middle East oil 
exporters, who exported to China more than two million 
barrels/day in 2010."' Beijing keeps a close eye on the 
current political events in the Middle East, and the 
instability that comes with them. Chinese policy planners 
develop alternative policies which could be implemented 
in the event that the United States decides to close, or at 
least filter, the Strait of Malacca, through which oil cargoes 
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from the Middle East , must pass.^ ^ Under these 
circumstances, China's oil and gas imports from Central 
Asia wi l l probably continue over the next few 
years—even potentially for decades—prompting the 
expansion of the energy sectors of the Central Asian 
hydrocarbon-rich states. Furthermore, Chinese imports 
of Central Asian oil and gas wil l divert a massive amount 
of revenue from China to Central Asia, in addition to 
providing a powerful alternative buyer to Russia.^' This 
will in turn give Central Asian governments more 
political leeway in their international relations. 
Kazakhstan seems quite conscious of this situation, and 
is accordingly currying favour with China, knowing the 
many benefits it could potentially reap. 
The spectacular economic growth in the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) in the last 20 years has 
generated intensive use of primary energy resources. 
Since the first half of the 1990s, China has not been able 
to meet all its energy needs from its own production and 
has thus become a net importer of oil and gas. The 
country became a net importer of natural gas in 2008 as 
the gap between supply and demand approached five 
billion cubic metres. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan, have 
abundant reserves of oil and are export-oriented 
economies. Therefore, the Chinese authorities have 
progressively, made energy a priority issue on their 
Central Asian agenda. This development has important 
implications and can be analysed from various angles. 
Firstly, China's own perspective on its present boom and 
how Beijing's, involvement in the Central Asian 
republics' development is perceived need to be taken into 
consideration. Secondly, the growing role of Central 
Asian energy issues in China's policy has important 
geopolitical implications, specifically on the relations 
between Moscow and Beijing. Energy is one of the 
strategic issues where the interests of Beijing and 
Moscow are clearly divergent and it has the potential to 
complicate the cooperative atmosphere the two powers 
have enjoyed in recent years. Moreover, it is necessary to 
contextualise the Caspian Basin's place within the overall 
energy strategy of the PRC. 
Kazakhstan has become one of China's main energy 
suppliers. In 2011, 11 million tons of oil flowed to China 
through the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, which runs 
from Kazakhstan's Caspian shore to Xinjiang in China.^" 
During a September 2011 visit to Central Asia, Chinese 
officials expressed their desire to expand energy trade 
with oilrich Kazakhstan."' The latter's oil exports are set 
to swell over the next few years. Astana is expecting a 50 
per cent increase by 2020,^' and China will receive the 
lion's share of this, as its domestic demand is increasing 
dramatically. Kazakhstan plans to export 22 million 
tons/year of oil to China by 2020, up from 12.1 million 
tons in 2 0 1 1 T o achieve this, it is currently boosting the 
export capacity of the Kazakhstan- China pipeline and 
constructing a parallel gas pipeline scheduled for 
completion by 2014.^ * This additional pipeline will also 
enable Kazakhstan to transport gas extracted in the 
western part of the country, where most of the deposits 
are located, to the more industrialised southern regions, 
reducing by the same token their reliance on Uzbek gas 
imports."' 
As in other areas, the purchase of oil deposits and 
the signing of long-term energy supply contracts are the 
main instruments used by China to influence the energy 
sector of Central Asian states. In 1997, after three years of 
negotiations, the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) began operating in Kazakhstan. Other major 
Chinese firms soon followed. In addition, Beijing and 
Astana signed in that year an agreement to construct a 
pipeline of almost 4,800 km connecting the Caspian Sea 
and the Xinjiang region in north-west China. 
The construction of the Kazakhstan-China oil 
pipeline was divided into three sections. The first section, 
linking Atyrau (north Caspian) with Aktobe region oil 
fields (western Kazakhstan) was completed in March 
2003. This section also carries oil to the west, towards the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, which 
cormects the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan with the 
Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, through 
Atyrau. The second 1,000-km section was built between 
September 2004 and December 2005 and links Atasu in 
central Kazakhstan to the border town of Alashankou in 
China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Like all 
other milestones in China's Central Asian energy 
development, the opening of this section of nearly 1,000 
miles generated much debate and some stridency. 
However, the Atasu-Alashankou section, the most 
important of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, is able 
to deliver only 10 million tons of crude oil a year to 
China, a modest amount considering China's oil needs. 
The third and final section, which connects Kenkiyak 
with Kumpol, was as per an agreement between 
Kazakhstan and China on 18 August 2007 and completed 
on 11 July 2009. This pipeline makes it possible to pump 
oil directly from the northern Caspian to the Dushanzi 
refinery in Xinjiang. 
To feed the pipeline, China has acquired, through 
various companies, exploitation rights to various oil 
fields in Kazakhstan. In the process Chinese companies 
have had to cope with both the suspicion their presence 
arouses and the relative delay in getting anything done, 
thus harming their position in the coveted Kazakh 
Caspian offshore fields. The exception is the Darkhan 
deposit, which they exploit under an agreement signed in 
October 2008. However, making a virtue of necessity and 
following a consistent business strategy, China has 
invested in oil fields located in the Aktobe region and in 
other more isolated sites along the route of the Sino-
Kazakh oil pipeline (Buzachi North, Karazhanbas and 
Kumkol in the Kyzyl-Orda region).™ 
These, along with the aforementioned Atasu 
connection to the pipeline going to Russia, make the 
Sino- Kazakh oil pipeline an alternative route for 
exporting Russian oil from western Siberia to China. As a 
result, Beijing has virtually assured sources of supply for 
a pipeline which currently has a maximum annual 
capacity of 20 million tons of crude that could be 
expanded to 30. The most significant Chinese 
investments in the Kazakh hydrocarbon secto have been 
the $4.2 takeover of PetroKazakhstan, a Canadian-based 
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company, by the Chinese oil company CNPC in August. 
2005 and the purchase for US$1.91 biUion of the 
Kazakhstan oil assets of Canada's Nations Energy 
Company Ltd by the China International Trust and 
Investment Corporation (CITIC) in December 2006. 
Through these two acquisitions Beijing acquired an 
important position in the Kazakh oil market and although 
the figures available vary substantially and are difficult to 
compute, it is estimated that in 2006 China was responsible 
for about 25 per cent of all oil extraction in Kazakhstan." 
This increase in China's presence in the Kazakh oil 
sector generated an animated public debate led by those 
who see in Beijing's policy a growing threat to 
Kazakhstan's economic sovereignty and autonomous 
development prospects. While some local analysts are 
known to dissent from the majority view and point out, for 
example, that contracts signed with Chinese companies 
are more beneficial to Kazakhstan than those signed with 
large Western companies, the controversy over the 
Chinese acquisitions has more particularly culminated in 
the Majlis, the parliament of Kazakhstan, which approved 
in September 2007 the introduction of a series of 
amendments to the law 'on subsurface and the use of the 
subsurface' dated 27 January 1996. The law expanded 
Astana's ability to revise or annul contracts concerning the 
exploitation of subsurface resources and posing a threat to 
'national economic security interests'." As a response to 
the $1.9 billion sale of the Karazhanbas oil field by 
Canada-based Nations Energy to CITIC, the Kazakh 
government passed a law preventing foreign investors 
from selling stakes in Kazakhstan's assets to third parties. 
Also, the 2005 sale of PetroKazakhstan Inc. to CNPC 
illustrated the need for the new law giving Kazakhstan the 
first right of refusal to buy assets in any proposed transfer 
of oil assets between foreign companies. Also , 
KasMunaiGas became a stakeholder in PetroKazakhstan 
in 2005, and following the passage of this amendment, 
KasMunaiGas executed an agreement with CITIC to 
purchase 50 per cent of Karazhanbas. It is interesting to 
note that the above PetroKazakhstan purchase created a 
similar reaction in Russia, especially among companies 
active in Kazakhstan, which share these misgivings about 
the progressive Chinese encroachment. 
The purchase of the Canadian firm by CNPC led to 
the Russian company Lukoil, which owns 25 per cent of 
the rights to the North Kumkol deposit, to go to both the 
Court of International Arbitration in Stockholm and the 
Kazakh courts to claim a preferential right to acquire the 
deposit. Through this action, Lukoil, which won the 
lawsuit, secured the rights to the entire reservoir. Lukoil is 
officially a private oil company but its actions, as is well 
known in the energy industry, are often in line with the 
wishes of the Kremlin. Therefore, some authors believe 
that this action shows that 'Russia is unwilling to allow 
China to have direct access to Central Asian energy 
resources'."' 
Within the SCO, which is paying increasing attention 
to energy issues, the approaches of Kazakhstan and Russia 
coincide. Despite the fear of potential dominance, 
Kazakhstan estimates that China's presence in its oil sector 
is of strategic importance in the long term. The 
Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline has already reduced 
Kazakhstan's dependence on the old Soviet pipeline 
network through which the majority of Kazakh oil exports 
still flow. The new pipeline allows direct access to the 
global economy, with its ever expanding oil consumption. 
Moreover, the weight of Chinese companies in the sector, 
though increasing, is still small in relative terms and 
barring new purchases of large deposits, their share in total 
Kazakh production wil l decrease significantly when the 
extraction of oil from the offshore Kashagan field, situated 
in the northern part of the Caspian Sea, begins.'" 
While energy wil l undoubtedly remain the nucleus of 
China-Kazakhstan cooperation, Chinese officials hope 
that in future this cooperation wil l not remain limited to oil 
and gas; they believe that it should be extended to clean 
and renewable energy as well."' In that regard, Beijing has 
singled out nuclear energy as a potentially important sector 
for bilateral cooperation. In 2011 Kazakhstan, which is 
well endowed with uranium ore, began exporting the 
indispensable resource for producing nuclear energy to 
China.'' 
These developments can only benefit Kazakhstan, as 
it requires new trading partners i f it is to become one of the 
top five oil producers in the world." President Nazarbayev 
has also committed his country to diversifying the 
economy, which can be achieved through major 
investment in the renewable energy sector. 
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